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From Nuclear Weapons to the Currency of Power 
Anne I. Harrington 
 
The idea that nuclear weapons function as a global currency of power has been circulating 
among nuclear experts since at least the 1970s. It is a concept that resonates strongly with the 
experience of diplomats working in the fields of arms control and nuclear nonproliferation, 
particularly those who represent the interests of states without nuclear weapons.1 Despite 
widespread colloquial use of the analogy between nuclear weapons and economic currency, there 
has been relatively little work done to develop the analogy beyond surface-level similarities and 
connotations of prestige. This failure to take the analogy seriously and develop its implications 
could be because there appears to be an obvious limit to its applicability: Unlike coins, nuclear 
weapons explode. In other words, the fact that nuclear weapons are a categorically different 
object than economic currencies such as salt, gold, or fiat money, appears to limit the deeper 
structural homologies between the logic of deterrence and the logic of economic exchange. What 
does it mean to claim that nuclear weapons are best understood not first and foremost as a 
weapon of war, but as a global power currency? 
 
In this paper I develop the analogy between economic theory and nuclear weapons as a currency 
of international power. I argue that although nuclear weapons may not yet function as a full-
fledged currency of power, they are much like what one could think of as a global power 
commodity. Despite obvious differences, the structural homologies between the logic of 
deterrence and the logic of economic exchange run much deeper than what might previously 
have been supposed. Developing these structural similarities is the heart of the argument. 
 
In the opening and closing sections I contest the two most common objections to the 
applicability of this particular economic analogy to the nuclear realm. First, the objection that 
nuclear weapons explode, while money does not, underestimates the role of physical violence in 
                                                          
1 States party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) sign as ‘nuclear weapon states’ or ‘non-nuclear weapon 
states.’ According to the terms of the treaty the status of ‘nuclear weapon state’ is reserved for those countries that 
tested a nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967, making it an exclusive club. There are five recognized 
nuclear weapon states: the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China. 
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establishing and maintaining the value of money. There are many theories of money, and where 
one comes down on the role of violence in establishing and maintaining the value of our 
economic currency depends on which theory one follows. Second, the tendency to underestimate 
the role of physical violence in economic exchange often leads people to assume that claiming 
nuclear weapons are a type of power commodity has little to do with hard security concerns. 
Rather than an argument about how and why deterrence works, there is a tendency to reduce 
arguments about nuclear weapons as a global power currency to the idea that nuclear weapons 
fulfill a desire for prestige. I argue that it is a mistake to conflate the role nuclear weapons (and 
nuclear materials more broadly) play as a global power currency with arguments about prestige 
because it sets up a false dichotomy between the pursuit of a state’s ‘real’ security interests and 
its desire for social standing. Rather, the transformation of nuclear weapons from a military 
instrument into a global currency of power is an extension of the security logic expressed by 
deterrence theory. 
 
In addition to its contribution to developing a theory of nuclear weapons as a global power 
currency, this paper also makes a contribution to policy-relevant debates about nuclear 
nonproliferation negotiations. The idea that arms control and nonproliferation agreements are 
little more than window dressing and have no “independent effect” on state behavior (or at best 
explain variation at the margin) is a common refrain in realist thought. Until recently, this has 
meant that, relative to the importance these agreements are accorded at US think tanks and in 
policy circles, there was little academic scholarship being done on the nonproliferation regime 
itself. The dynamic has slowly begun to shift as younger political scientists have shown an 
increasing interest in testing hypotheses against data sets derived from the Cold War.2 However, 
                                                          
2 See for instance, Matthew Fuhrmann, “Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation 
Agreements,” International Security 34 (2009): 7–41; Matthew Fuhrmann, “Taking a Walk on the Supply Side: The 
Determinants of Civilian Nuclear Cooperation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (2009): 181–208; Matthew 
Fuhrmann, Atomic Assistance: How “Atoms for Peace” Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2012); Matthew Fuhrmann and Sarah E. Kreps, “Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace: A 
Quantitative Empirical Analysis, 1941–2000,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54 (2010): 831–59; Dong-Joon Jo and 
Erik Gartzke, “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: A Quantitative Model,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 51 (2007): 167–94; Matthew Kroenig, “Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear 
Assistance,” American Political Science Review 103 (2009): 113–33; Matthew Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb: 
Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010). Matthew 
Kroenig, “Force or Friendship? Explaining Great Power Nonproliferation Policy,” Security Studies 23 (2014): 1–32; 
Nuno P. Monteiro and Alexandre Debs, “The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation” International Security 39 
(2014): 7–51; Alexander H. Montgomery, “Ringing in Proliferation: How to Dismantle an Atomic Bomb Network,” 
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the nonproliferation regime’s independent effect, in so far as they find one, is limited to 
coordinating the independent interests of non-nuclear weapon states in halting the spread of 
nuclear weapons, thereby decreasing the burden of enforcing the superpower consensus against 
rogues and outliers.3 
 
In contrast, a theory of nuclear weapons as a currency of power renders visible the practices that 
are essential to understanding the role of nuclear technology in mediating this diplomatic realm 
of strategic interaction. Rather than discounting arms control negotiations as façades that hide a 
state’s real intentions, an interpretation of nuclear weapons as a ‘power commodity’ places arms 
control and nonproliferation negotiations at the center of the analysis as sites of exchange. 
Nuclear nonproliferation agreements, like the one just concluded between the P5+1 and Iran, are 
the primary vehicle for negotiating the terms of exchange. 
 
The first section of this paper reviews the recent literature on causes of proliferation and makes 
the case that it is a mistake to reduce a theory of nuclear weapons as a currency of power to the 
pursuit of status or prestige. The second section establishes a link between a theory of nuclear 
weapons as a currency of power and nuclear deterrence theory by drawing out the parallel 
between Schelling’s distinction between ‘brute force’ and the ‘power to hurt,’ and the distinction 
in economic theory between products and commodities. In doing so it also introduces the main 
elements of a theory of nuclear weapons as a currency of power. The third section confronts the 
most common objection to a theory of nuclear weapons as a currency of power, namely that 
nuclear weapons “still explode.” In conclusion, I suggest avenues for future research that would 
further develop the policy-relevant aspects of this research agenda. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
International Security 30 (2005): 153–87; Maria Rost Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear 
Restraint (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009). Dane Swango, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: 
Constrainer, Screener, or Enabler” (PhD diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 2009); Dane Swango, “The 
United States and the Role of Nuclear Cooperation and Assistance in the Design of the Non-proliferation Treaty,” 
International History Review 26 (2014): 210–29. For a recent review of this literature, see Scott D. Sagan, “The 
Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” Annual Reviews of Political Science 14 (2011): 225–44. 
3 Andrew Coe and Jane Vaynman, “Collusion and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” Journal of Politics, 77, 4 





Nuclear Proliferation and the Mistaken Demand for Prestige 
Despite its resonance with policymakers, the idea that nuclear weapons are a global power 
currency has played a minor role in the US debate about nuclear proliferation. US-based research 
on why states choose to build nuclear weapons is commonly understood to have two strands: 
‘demand-side’ and ‘supply-side’ explanations. The primary puzzle that motivates this debate is 
that the nuclear dominos never fell as Albert Wohlstetter and others predicted they would.4 There 
is a significant gap between the number of nuclear capable states and those that have weaponized 
their nuclear programs. 
 
The touchstone for the demand side literature is Sagan’s 1996 article “Three Models in Search of 
a Bomb.” In it, Sagan divides the existing literature into three main paradigms.5 His three-part 
structure maps loosely onto the demand-side debate even 20 years later. There are realists, who 
focus on the anarchic structure of the international system as driving a state to seek security;6 
domestic institutionalists, who focus on the bureaucratic sources of foreign policy;7 and a third 
category that includes ‘constructivist’ arguments broadly construed to include norms, identity, 
and prestige.8 Sagan concludes that, although the realist model may best explain the most cases, 
the evidence supports a multi-causal approach. States do build the bomb when their security is 
threatened as a realist would contend, but there are also cases in which state behavior is better 
explained by bureaucratic bargaining processes or as a desire for international prestige. 
 
Despite the fact that Sagan continues to argue that no one theory effectively dominates the field,9 
there is a general bias towards security-based realist explanations. This bias supports a default 
assumption among realists that there is little to no linkage between the NPT and proliferation. It 
                                                          
4 Albert Wohlstetter, “Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N+1 Problem,” Foreign Affairs (April 1961). 
5 Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International 
Security 21(Winter 1996/97), pp. 54-86; See also Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? 
An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate,” Nonproliferation Review 2 (Fall 1996): 43–60. 
6 Nuno P. Monteiro and Alexandre Debs, “The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation,” International Security 39, 
2 (2014): 7–50. 
7 Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). 
8 Maria Rost Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint (Atlanta: University of Georgia 
Press, 1995); Barry O'Neill, “Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige,” Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 
1560, February 2006. 




is not that they consider the NPT to be a cause of proliferation, but simply that they consider 
proliferation agreements largely irrelevant to the problem of proliferation. 
 
In contrast, the supply-side literature, with its focus on the diffusion and availability of 
technology as a determinant of nuclear proliferation, finds fault with the NPT, which gives non-
nuclear weapon states assistance with nuclear energy programs in exchange for abstaining from 
building a bomb. Not only do supply-side researchers find that the NPT’s effect on a state’s 
decision about whether or not to weaponize its nuclear program is marginal, but that the NPT 
spurs nuclear proliferation because it aids in the diffusion of nuclear technology.10 As Erik 
Gartzke and Dong Joon Jo put it in their 2007 article, “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons 
Proliferation”: “The NPT system variable probably has a slight normative constraint on 
proliferation, as the negative coefficient in the weapons stage implies. However, the inhibiting 
effect of the NPT is overcome by the stronger technological diffusion effect. Enthusiasm for the 
NPT among proliferation opponents thus appears to be misplaced.”11 Matthew Fuhrmann, in 
particular, seeks to flip the standard narrative on its head by stating unequivocally that, “the 
conventional wisdom [about nuclear cooperation] is wrong—and dangerous.”12 To summarize, 
he argues that civilian nuclear assistance increases the probability of weapons proliferation, 
especially if a country that already has an active civilian program becomes involved in a 
militarized dispute.13 Instead of attributing the gap between (a) the number of nuclear capable 
states and (b) those that have weaponized their nuclear programs to the existence of the NPT, 
according to this school of thought the gap is due to the US “nuclear umbrella.” In other words, 
the primary reason that states do not proliferate is that the United States extends its nuclear 
deterrent to allies through security guarantees.14 
 
These supply-side findings are not uncontroversial—tellingly, Fuhrmann’s data indicate that 
more than 99% of the time, civilian nuclear cooperation does not lead to a weapons program, 
                                                          
10 Jo and Gartzke 2007; Fuhrmann 2009; Fuhrmann 2012; Kroenig 2010. 
11 Jo and Gartzke 2007, 185. 
12 Fuhrmann 2009, 8. 
13 Fuhrmann 2009, 30. 
14 John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” International Security, 15, 1 
(Summer 1990); “Pushing and Pulling: The Western System, Nuclear Weapons, and the End of the Cold War,” 
(with G. John Ikenberry) International Politics (July/September 2011): 496–554. 
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much less a bomb, a statistic that highlights just how vanishingly small his findings are. They 
also fly in the face of received political wisdom. Campbell Craig and Jan Ruzicka refer to the 
network of “governmental agencies, international nongovernmental organizations, think tanks, 
and academic programs and institutes” that support and promote the twin goals of 
nonproliferation and disarmament as the “Nonproliferation Complex.”15 The nonproliferation 
complex takes as its point of departure a belief that the NPT—if it is properly implemented and 
maintained—is an effective policy tool. Analysts argue that the health of the NPT requires 
adherence to its grand bargain: it requires nuclear weapon states to uphold their Article VI 
commitment to the pursuit of disarmament.16 Jeffrey Knopf refers to this belief as the “linkage 
hypothesis,”17 the merits of which became a regular feature of the mainstream US foreign policy 
debate after the Obama administration made the link between the US commitment to 
disarmament under the NPT and the adherence of non-nuclear weapon states to nonproliferation 
a central feature of its 2009 Nuclear Posture Review. 
 
Within this discursive landscape, the idea that nuclear weapons function of as a currency of 
power is typically interpreted as being a demand-side argument about prestige. 
K. Subrahmanyam, an Indian strategic affairs analyst and champion of India’s nuclear deterrent, 
developed the most extended treatment of the analogy between nuclear weapons and economic 
currency, and explained the connection to prestige. The interpretation of nuclear weapons as a 
‘global power currency’ has long been influential in India, one of the few states that has 
continuously flouted nuclear norms by refusing to sign the NPT. Instead India developed its own 
nuclear deterrent and in 2009 signed a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with the United 
States, an agreement that provides India with many of the same benefits as being a signatory to 
the NPT. For Subrahmanyam, nuclear weapons functioned as a ‘coin’ of the international realm: 
“The debate in the U.S. strategic community on the number of warheads, throw-weights, etc. 
gives an impression that nuclear weaponry today is used in international politics somewhat in the 
                                                          
15 Campbell Craig and Jan Ruzicka, “The Nonproliferation Complex” Ethics & International Affairs, 27, 3 (Fall 
2013). 
16 George Perkovitch and James Acton, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, Washington, DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2008; Harald Müller, “The 2010 NPT Review Conference: Some Breathing 
Space Gained, But No Breakthrough,” The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs 45, 3 
(2010). 
17 Jeffrey Knopf, “Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation: Examining the Linkage Argument,” International 
Security 37, 3 (Winter 2012/13): 92–132. 
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way gold stocks have been used in international economics. Gold by itself was of limited use; its 
value largely depended upon its acceptance by the international trading community. Similarly 
today, the major nuclear weapon powers are attempting to use their nuclear weapon stockpiles as 
an international currency of power.” From this premise, Subrahmanyam went on to defend the 
nuclear ambitions of non-nuclear weapon states: “If this is so, then it is only logical to expect 
other nations which have a nuclear option to use it as a symbol of power and prestige.”18 
Subrahmanyam argued that nuclear weapons were not primarily military instruments. It was the 
entrance that they bought to exclusive diplomatic realms that, in his view, was the primary 
reason that India should develop its own nuclear deterrent.19 
 
If Subrahmanyan’s interpretation of nuclear weapons as means to securing symbolic power and 
prestige is correct, then theorizing prestige is the key to developing a theory of nuclear weapons 
as a currency of power. Prestige is often offered as the ‘third’ explanation. It is the one into 
which cases that do not have straightforward security logics or bureaucratic institutional stories 
fall.20 Given the prominence of prestige as an explanation for nuclear proliferation, there is a 
relative paucity of published work on the concept. Barry O’Neill’s 2006 discussion paper is the 
most thorough application of prestige to questions of nuclear weapons.21 
 
Prestige is what O’Neill calls a “second-level belief” where “[if] the ‘zero-th level’ of belief is 
the objective situation and the first level is beliefs about that situation…then prestige is at the 
second level.” Prestige is not simply a belief shared in a dyadic sense between two individuals, 
rather it is the function of a belief that is believed to be commonly held within a group. There is a 
perception, correct or not, that a general consensus exists. O’Neill again: “A party has prestige 
with a group for a certain quality if (a) the members generally believe that they generally believe 
that the party has the quality; (b) they generally believe that they see the quality as desirable, and 
(c) they generally believe on account of the considerations in (a) and (b) that the party holds 
                                                          
18 Amtav Ghosh, “Countdown: Why Can’t Every Country Have the Bomb,” The New Yorker, October 26, 1998. 
Accessed June 17, 2016 at http://archives.newyorker.com/?i=1998-10-26#folio=CV1. 
19 Ghosh 1998. 
20 Peter Lavoy, “Learning to Live with the Bomb? India and Nuclear Weapons, 1947–1974” (Ph.D. diss., University 
of California, Berkeley, 1997), cited in O’Neill 2006. 
21 O'Neill 2006. 
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power with the group.”22 Prestige, while it attaches to an individual, is a phenomenon that 
belongs to a group in the sense that it is an effect that emerges from a multiplicity of interactions, 
with or without the presence of the individual in question (who may or may not be a member of 
the group). The experience of prestige, therefore, confronts individuals as an external fact of life, 
one that can be controlled and manipulated only indirectly. Based on this definition, O’Neill then 
goes on to model different mechanisms for influencing prestige through the revelation of 
information about capabilities. 
 
While O’Neill does not develop the concept of prestige in relation to currency, he does in a 
passing comment say that it is “somewhat like money, which is largely social and reflexive in 
nature, and is a common metaphor for prestige.”23 Technically, it would have been more correct 
to say that prestige is like wealth, and those objects that support the group-level belief system by 
communicating and conferring prestige (e.g., nuclear weapons) are like money in this analogy; 
nonetheless, what he is correctly identifying is the structural similarity at work. There is a similar 
dynamic in the experience of individuals vis-à-vis the group, in that prestige (the having of it or 
not) confronts each individual as an objective social fact, just as the value of a dollar bill, while 
socially constructed, likewise confronts each individual as an objective and unalterable reality. 
The strength, or stickiness, of that social fact should then vary with the conditions of the group 
but, like economic inflation and deflation, can be controlled or influenced only indirectly 
(through the control of a central bank over exchange rates, for instance). 
 
The strength of this prestige perspective lies in this similarity to the currency of power analogy. 
It moves beyond the simply dyadic constructions of deterrence theory, which reduce 
international politics to a two-player game rather than accounting for the existence of a structural 
level dynamic. Yet, despite the evident associations between ‘prestige’ and ‘money,’ I will argue 
in the following section that it is just as much of a mistake to conflate the theory of nuclear 
weapons as a global power currency with motives of prestige as it would be to conflate monetary 
theory with the pursuit of wealth. States that mistake manipulating the ‘currency of power’ for 
the simple pursuit of prestige will make errors in judgment with potentially disastrous 
                                                          
22 O’Neill 2006. 
23 O’Neill 2006, 2. 
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consequences. O’Neill, rightly, distinguishes the prestige motive from a state’s ‘objective’ 
interests, which leads O’Neill to the conclusion that prestige is a motive that can divert a state 
from doing what is in its military interest. As O’Neill argues: “States often forgo their direct 
interests for the sake of prestige, investing in projects that display their modernity, engaging in 
conflicts over symbols of prestige, or building grand but impractical weapons.”24 However, as I 
will explain, a theory of nuclear weapons as a global currency of power renders visible the 
processes through which states ‘trade’ on nuclear technology in order to achieve their foreign 
policy and military goals. 
 
What this mistaken prestige perspective overlooks is the extent to which deterrence theory is 
already a theory of nuclear weapons as a currency of power. The conflation of the currency 
argument with prestige is due, at least in part, to the perception that deterrence theory deals with 
the materiality of nuclear weapons and their violence, and saying that nuclear weapons are a 
global power currency is an argument about their diplomatic function. However, as Thomas 
Schelling explains, deterrence is also a diplomatic practice. It is the “diplomacy of violence.”25 
This diplomatic practice is predicated on a distinction between what he calls ‘brute force’ and the 
‘power to hurt,’ a distinction that shares structural similarities in common with a distinction from 
economic theory: products versus commodities. 
 
Brute Force, the Power to Hurt, and the Logic of Commodity Exchange 
In Arms and Influence, Thomas Schelling develops a distinction between ‘brute force’ and the 
‘power to hurt.’ “Brute force,” Schelling explains, “can only accomplish what requires no 
collaboration,” goals such as “exclusion, expulsion and extermination.”26 In contrast, the ‘power 
to hurt’ aims at getting the adversary to ‘come along’ on some level: “‘Come-along’ holds are 
those that threaten pain or disablement, giving relief as long as the victim complies, giving him 
the option of using his own legs...” In other words, the distinction is between the different ends 
to which physical violence is a means. Although some forms of violence are more appropriate to 
brute force objectives and others more appropriate to inflicting pain in order to induce 
                                                          
24 O’Neill 2006, 1. 
25 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). 
26 Schelling 1996, 8. 
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compliance, the same means can be applied (short of annihilation) to either end. While clear 
enough in theory, in practice the difference between brute force and the power to hurt is not so 
simple. Both rely on the means of physical violence. As a result they may, at times, appear 
identical to an outside observer. The difference lies only in the intended result. In fact, obscuring 
intentions may be strategic. Playing on the possibility that one intends to use brute force to 
exclude, expel, or exterminate an adversary (even if one does not intend to go so far) can be an 
advantage in leveraging one’s ‘power to hurt’ another. 
 
Brute force is only effective against adversaries you can afford to objectify, those whose 
thoughts, feelings, and desires you can ignore. In contrast, the power to hurt requires that you 
care for the limits of what physical violence can accomplish and appropriately calibrate the level 
of harm you impose to activate your adversary’s desire to avoid further punishment. According 
to Schelling, “…it is not the pain and damage itself but its influence on somebody’s behavior 
that matters. It is the expectation of more violence that gets the wanted behavior, if the power to 
hurt can get it at all.”27 Physical torture to extract information is a good example of the power to 
hurt. The purpose of torture is not the act of creating pain in and of itself. The purpose of torture 
is to harness the threat of more pain to come in order to produce information that cannot be 
extracted through violence alone. Go too far and the desired information will be lost: “It is latent 
violence that can influence someone’s choice—violence that can still be withheld or inflicted.”28 
The power to hurt opens and maintains a space for interaction ‘before’ violence by postponing 
the realization of that violence indefinitely into the future. This is the space in which the 
practices of nuclear deterrence, arms control, and nonproliferation take place. They are all 
mechanisms that exist to prevent a nuclear war from happening now, and hopefully make its 
possibility an ever more vanishing feature of the future. 
 
A successful deterrent leverages the power to hurt. It prevents military aggression by the threat, 
explicit or implicit, of imposing costs in return. This is a standard definition of a punishment-
based deterrent. However, Schelling’s distinction between brute force and the power to hurt 
suggests a further refinement. Deterrence is the act of invoking a credible threat (implicit or 
                                                          
27 Schelling 1966, 3. 
28 Schelling 1966, 3. 
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explicit) of continued or future application of physical violence in order to discourage an action 
not preventable through violence alone. Take, for instance, a splendid first strike. A splendid 
first strike is a brute force attempt to destroy the opponents’ nuclear capabilities and eliminate 
their capacity to retaliate in kind. Leveraging the power to hurt to deter a nuclear attack becomes 
necessary when a splendid first strike is either militarily infeasible or politically undesirable. 
This second definition of deterrence emphasizes that a strategy of deterrence establishes a link 
between violence and the realm of cooperative interaction. This is Schelling’s essential insight, 
that models of zero-sum games do not capture the complexities of social interactions, that 
effective strategies—short of extermination—always leverage a combination of conflict and 
cooperation. 
 
The ‘power to hurt’ provides the conceptual foundation for the transformation of nuclear 
weapons from an instrument of violence into a currency of power. This is because the power to 
hurt is predicated on establishing a reciprocal (though not equal) relationship with your 
adversary. Therefore, the material characteristics that make an object a desirable weapon are of 
immediate significance in evaluating the effectiveness of brute force, but of secondary 
importance when your goal is to leverage the power to hurt. Of primary importance is what is 
sometimes referred to in the literature on deterrence as their ‘threat-value.’ If your goal is to 
leverage your power to hurt to influence the behavior of your adversary, the instruments of 
violence at your disposal play a foundational role in placing a demand on your adversary’s 
attention. This is their primary source of value to you, their ‘threat-value.’ Threat-value is only 
indirectly linked to the specific material properties of the weapon in question. It is not that the 
mechanism for the delivery of pain is irrelevant, but rather that it is of secondary importance to 
the behavior of one’s adversary. The success of a deterrent strategy is not measured in terms of 
how much pain you are able to inflict, but rather in how effectively the threat of that pain 
influences your adversary’s course of action. 
 
The nuclear age ushered in a structural shift in the underlying purpose of organized military 
violence. As Bernard Brodie famously argued, “Thus far the chief purpose of our military 
establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can 
14 
 
have almost no other useful purpose.”29 This shift in ends, from goals that can be accomplished 
through physical violence alone to goals that require cooperation, opens the door to the 
transformation of nuclear materials from a weapon of war to a currency of power, but this 
transformation is far from inevitable or complete. 
 
At present, the system of a nuclear ‘global power currency’ is far from resembling anything more 
than the barter of commodities. Nuclear materials do not (yet) mediate relations with the same 
fluidity that money does. As I will explain, money is a special type of highly saleable 
commodity, produced and regulated for the purpose of facilitating and mediating the exchange of 
commodities. Developing a system in which the fissile materials necessary to sustain a chain 
reaction and generate a nuclear explosion (uranium 235 and plutonium) function like a currency 
similar to gold, or perhaps like a purpose-specific coupon or other type of special money,30 
would require further institu–tionalization of the control of fissile materials. There would need to 
be an institutionalization of those mechanisms, including the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and 
the further development of the system of fuel banks, designed to accentuate the qualities of 
fissile materials essential to their role as a currency, namely scarcity and durability. 
 
A more accurate parallel for what Subrahmanyam referred to as ‘nuclear coins’ would be 
‘nuclear commodities.’ Nuclear weapons in their role as a deterrent function much like a 
commodity within a barter system. Structurally, Schelling’s distinction between brute force and 
the power to hurt mimics the Marxian distinction between a product and a commodity. The 
product/commodity distinction, and more specifically its roots in the labor theory of value, is not 
uncontroversial. The interpretation of it here is derived from the early pages of Capital, which 
even Marxist scholars find challenging and contradictory.31 However, for the purposes of this 
analysis it is possible to set aside the controversial aspects of determining the basis of absolute 
value. What is significant for this discussion is that, like the distinction between brute force and 
the power to hurt, the difference between a product and a commodity exists not in the material 
                                                          
29 Bernard Brodie, “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” International Security 2, 4, (Spring 1978): 65–83. 
30 Viviana A. Zelizer, “The Social Meaning of Money: ‘Special Monies’,” American Journal of Sociology 
95, 2 (September 1989): 342–377.  
31 Arjun Appadurai, The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986). 
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means available, but only in terms of the ends for which the item is intended. Products are made 
for personal consumption, whereas the logic of exchange governs the production of 
commodities. The same physical item can be either a product or a commodity depending on 
whether or not the owner intends to realize its value through consumption or exchange, just as a 
weapon can be used for brute force or the power to hurt. 
 
Like commodities, the production of nuclear weapons is driven, not by plans for their immediate 
consumption, but rather by the role in a complex system of reciprocal exchange. The threat-value 
of nuclear weapons is always relative and reflexively determined. The (threat) value of action C 
is expressed through its equivalence to the value of the adversary’s reaction B, and vice versa. In 
other words, in order for military action C to be understood as having value as a threat, a second 
military action B (the value of which must be equal to or less than the value of action C) must 
have been threatened, and it must be possible for action C to be interpreted as a meaningful 
response to action B (meaning that there is a level on which the two actions can be understood as 
commensurable). In the language of deterrence theory, the perceived costs of a retaliatory attack 
must exceed the perceived benefits of aggressive military action for deterrence to be successful.32 
 
This logic of establishing value through relative and reflexive calculations provides a bridge to 
the new practices of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy in which states ‘trade’ on nuclear 
technology to achieve political ends not achievable through violence alone. These diplomatic 
negotiations take place in the time and space opened by the mutual threat of ‘more to come.’ A 
theory of nuclear weapons as a currency of power complements deterrence theory by theorizing 
the role of materiality in constituting this new diplomatic realm. Whereas deterrence theory 
concentrates attention on the physical characteristics that make nuclear weapons an effective 
instrument of violence, a theory of nuclear weapons as a currency of power reveals the 
importance of scarcity, durability, and divisibility in making nuclear weapons—and increasingly 
the fissile materials that are necessary to sustain a nuclear chain reaction—essential to 
understanding the practice of ‘trading’ on access to nuclear materials within this diplomatic 
realm. 
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Arguably countries like North Korea and Iran have responded successfully to the emergent 
incentives of this system in which flirting with crossing a nuclear threshold, or hedging, can open 
negotiations with one or more of the nuclear weapons states. In this way both North Korea and 
Iran, by first developing and then giving up a portion of their nuclear capabilities have been able 
to secure other goods (ends not achievable through violence alone), including, for instance, food 
aid and the lifting of sanctions. Iraq, in contrast, (one of the states that O’Neill points to as 
evidence for his theory of prestige) failed to understand the structural incentives and was caught 
without any nuclear materials or illicit activities to trade away. Far from the desire for prestige, 
these strategies resulted in tangible costs and benefits. 
 
Increasingly what we are seeing is a choice between thickening an international nonproliferation 
regime dedicated to maintaining the characteristics that may some day make fissile materials an 
effective currency of power and contribute to the project of disarmament through the gradual 
disembodiment of nuclear weapons, or a return to a world of naked deterrence and 
brinksmanship. Confidence in that system, even today, remains closely linked to the underlying 
access to brute force afforded by nuclear weapons. However, that does not mean that a 
transformation toward a thicker system of arms control and nonproliferation could not provide a 
means for reducing the dependence on an ever-present nuclear threat to maintain the system of 
strategic stability.33 
 
But Nuclear Weapons Still Explode 
The most common objection to this project is the fact that, unlike a currency such as gold, 
“nuclear weapons still explode.” There are usually one of two intuitions behind this objection. 
The first is a basic misunderstanding of currency and its relationship to materiality. In the United 
States and Western Europe it is entirely possible to take for granted the experience of money as 
digits on a screen, but that is a relatively new and rare phenomenon. Therefore, I open this 
section with a basic explanation of gold as an example of what I mean by currency. The second 
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intuition behind the objection is an imagination of currency as emerging out of relationships of 
cooperation in which the problem of violence has been previously solved. This objection often 
comes from individuals with a neorealist orientation who generally view international 
institutions as simply epiphenomenal of great power interests. I point this out because these same 
individuals also tend to gravitate toward a similar understanding of money (the Mengerian theory 
of money). There are, in fact, many theories of money, most of which take relationships of 
violence and power as endemic to the emergence of money. The implicit theory of money in this 
paper is most closely associated with Georg Simmel.34 
 
Currency is a special commodity, one that is particularly salable because it has been collectively 
deemed to be a medium of exchange. Currencies take many forms. The money that we use as 
currency in today’s digital age is disembodied to a historically unprecedented extent. Today our 
confidence in the global financial system is linked to the credibility of the United States’ 
government to maintain the value of its dollar. Historically, however, confidence in the value of 
currencies was more closely linked to their material properties. Until President Richard Nixon 
abandoned the gold standard in 1971, gold backed all US dollars, meaning that every US dollar 
could be exchanged for an equivalent amount of gold. 
 
Gold has a number of characteristics that make it appropriate to serve as a currency. It is scarce, 
durable, and divisible. Unlike paper money (which is artificially scarce), gold is naturally scarce, 
meaning there is a limited supply of it found in nature. It cannot be manufactured, except 
(ironically) through bombardment in a nuclear reactor or intense neutron source. The gold 
manufactured through this process is, however, radioactive and therefore not appropriate to be 
circulated as currency. Gold is durable, meaning it does not decay over time, and by heating it, 
gold becomes divisible into measurable units of different quantitates. 
 
Gold also possesses many other material properties that make it useful, not only as a medium of 
exchange, but also as a product of consumption. It is unusually malleable, conducts electricity, 
will not tarnish, is a good metal alloy, and can be worked into wires or sheets. All of these 
sensuous qualities mean gold has many applications in addition to its role as a medium of 
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exchange.35 Dentists use gold as a tooth filling, aerospace engineers as a lubricant and protective 
shield, and electrical engineers as a conductor. Small amounts of it exist in many of our 
appliances and computers.36 
 
The idea that gold is valuable, not only because it is a medium of exchange, but also because it 
valuable in an absolute sense, accords with a certain common-sense understanding of how 
money works. It corresponds more or less to the barter theory of money, which is associated with 
the Austrian school of economic thought and the work of Carl Menger. The intuition behind this 
approach is the idea that money exists because it solves the basic problem of barter. Namely, in 
order to make a successful trade you have to find someone else who both has something you 
want and that wants what you have to give. This may be difficult, however, depending on how 
salable the commodity you have is. First, you may have to make a trade for something that you 
do not want simply because it is more salable than what you had before. In this way you increase 
your probability of securing that thing you ultimately want. Over time communities converge 
around certain commodities that are eventually universally accepted as money. Once a 
commodity is universally accepted as money it is differentiated from other commodities by the 
fact that it becomes increasingly more salable and it is sought after purely because of its function 
as a medium of exchange.37 
 
The commodity theory of money accords most closely with the realist interpretation of the power 
of nuclear weapons. The similarities are not accidental. In fact, Waltz’s book Theory of 
International Politics, which continues to be a touchstone for the American field of International 
Relations more than four decades after its publication, draws explicit parallels between the 
structural realist theory he develops and the brand of neoclassical economic theory closely 
associated with the Austrian school. Just as the basic laws of supply and demand arise from the 
interaction of firms, the laws that govern state behavior are not imposed by an external political 
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authority, but rather arise from the interaction of states under the condition of anarchy. In order 
to complete the analogy, power for Waltz must then function much like money, which he 
achieves by assuming perfect fungibility between power and its resources.38 
 
Nuclear weapons, within this neorealist framework, are the ultimate form of power. Just as 
money emerges out of a barter system by solving the problems of inefficiency, nuclear weapons 
as a new commodity form emerge out of state-based interactions by solving the problem posed 
by the inefficiency (or more specifically, the irrationality) of nuclear war. Likewise, as for 
Menger, where the commodity that emerges as a universal equivalent does so not simply because 
of the qualities that make it an appropriate money form (scarcity, durability, divisibility), but also 
because it is a more saleable commodity in its own right, the emergence of nuclear weapons as a 
special form of weapon that achieves a suprasensible status as an object of exchange is not 
separable from their absolute value as an instrument of violence. Within a realist framework, the 
capacity for violence is ultimately the source of a nuclear weapon’s power. 
 
However, as Nigel Dodd explains in his book, The Social Life of Money, there are competing 
theories of money. There is the debt theory of money, which is most closely associated with 
Maynard Keynes, there is Georg Simmel’s philosophy of money, there is Marcel Maus’ 
description of money’s relationship to gift exchange, or an adaptation of Rene Gerard’s theory of 
money as the product of a system based on mimesis and violence. Unlike the Austrian school’s 
idea of money as emerging from barter between equals, many of these other theories emphasize 
money’s relationship to power, violence, sacrifice, and authority. They challenge the image of 
commerce as a realm of exchange free of power politics, instead emphasizing the pacifying 
effects of monetary exchange. 
 
Take for instance the Keynesian model. Money grows out of the practice of paying tribute, or 
offering sacrifice. It is rooted in obligation and originates in a debt to the gods. There is 
evidence, for instance, of associations between early Greek coinage and sacrificial objects, 
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particularly iron spits (etymologically, the Greek ‘drachma’ means “a handful of spits”).39 The 
crucial point here is that money does not emerge out of a commercial relationship between 
equals, but rather is a tax paid to a political or religious authority. Money does not exist 
independently of the state in a purely commercial sphere, but rather is a product of state 
authority. This alternative Keynesian framing carries with it very different policy implications 
than the Austrian model described above in that it prescribes a much larger role for the state in 
managing the value of money. 
 
A Keynesian model of money in application to nuclear strategy points towards the necessity of a 
world state. The role of the state in the debt theory of money suggests that, for nuclear weapons 
to continue to develop as a power commodity, a supranational authority with the ability to 
impose obligations on states and regulate the value of a ‘nuclear currency’ will be necessary. 
This interpretation of money as deriving its power from the authority of social institutions leads 
to the conclusion that the violence of nuclear weapons is necessary to their power unless or until 
a world state with a legitimate monopoly on the use of violence displaces the role of nuclear 
weapons in maintaining a stable deterrent. 
 
Georg Simmel offers yet another alternative. He theorizes exchange as a process of “reciprocal 
surrender” or “mutual sacrifice” because to “gain something, we must simultaneously lose.”40 
The objects that are valuable to us are the ones that resist our desires and are most difficult to 
acquire. In other words, they are the most valuable precisely because their gain entails the 
greatest loss. Value, and money as its embodiment, is the quantification of this loss; it is a 
measure of the distance between a subject and his or her object of desire. Simmel’s theory has 
many more dimensions, but what is essential to take away from it for the purpose of this 
discussion is that this process of quantification introduces an element of detachment from the 
underlying object. As Dodd explains it: “money represents the generic idea of value. By virtue of 
its objective and abstract character, money is capable of standing in for any specific, concrete 
value in the process of exchange.”41 Money as a universal equivalent inserts a new element into 
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the process of exchange, one that changes the character of the relation between both the subjects 
engaged in a reciprocal act of exchange and their relationship to the objects of their desire. This 
is an evolutionary story about how money constitutes relations. The argument is that money 
through the act of quantification introduces a new element into social processes. 
 
In so far as the act of quantification enables the reification of social value and enables the 
alienation of subjects from the fruits of their labors, this act of quantification is a frequent subject 
of critique. However, arguably, the processes of quantification that constitute nuclear war plans 
and arms control negotiations enable the transition from a world of violent conflict to the 
achievement of ends that could not be achieved through the application of violence alone. 
Deterrence provides the underlying logic of equivalence, but once quantification is introduced 
through arms control, the character of the process changes. There is a level of abstraction 
inserted between the military requirements of deterrence and what would become the standard 
practice of agreeing upon equal numbers. According to Steve Kull, the moment at which the 
relative value of nuclear weapons was divorced from any direct relationship to an underlying 
basis in material effects was during the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Kull argues 
that the substitution of a numerical balance of nuclear forces for a military strategic analysis 
became a matter of official US policy with the ratification of the SALT I Treaty in 1972. At the 
time of the negotiations, the negotiators of the treaty were primarily concerned with its strategic 
military implications, and thus, in the spirit of détente, were willing to accept numerical 
inferiority in some areas for superiority in others. However, when ratifying the treaty, the Senate 
added an amendment stating that the United States would negotiate a subsequent treaty with the 
Soviet Union that “would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces 
inferior to the limits for the Soviet Union.”42 
 
Up until this time, the nuclear arms race between the two countries had been driven by the logic 
of counterforce targeting, which meant that the relative value of nuclear weapons maintained a 
basis in military utility. The US and Soviet arsenals were tied to one another through the military 
practice of targeting. Although the illogic of the size of the arsenals was too apparent to ignore 
entirely, especially for those with top-secret knowledge of the intimate details, the legitimacy of 
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the nuclear arsenal was still maintained with respect to the value of destructive effects of the 
weapons. 
 
Arms control transformed the basis of the threat-value of nuclear weapons by politicizing 
numerical equivalence at the expense of military utility. As US Secretary of Defense under 
President Jimmy Carter, Harold Brown, argued in defense of START II: “The United States and 
its allies must be free from any coercion and intimidation that could result from perceptions of an 
overall imbalance or particular asymmetries in nuclear forces.… Insistence on essential 
equivalence guards against any danger that the Soviets might be seen as superior—even if the 
perception is not technically justified.”43 Negotiated limits on the value of the US and Soviet 
arsenals moved the basis upon which the relative value of nuclear weapons is calculated from 
material effects (as senseless as understanding those effects in relative terms may be) to a basis 
in the political perception of relative equality. 
 
Conclusion 
Contrary to the assumption that, due to the inherent violence of nuclear weapons, there is a limit 
to the application of the analogy between currency and the role of nuclear materials in mediating 
international conflict, I argue that this limitation is overcome by the same distinction that 
Thomas Schelling developed to cope with the irrationality of mutual assured destruction. The 
similarities between deterrence theory and economic theory begin with Schelling’s distinction 
between ‘brute force’ and the ‘power to hurt.’ This distinction is central to debates about nuclear 
strategy. It provides the conceptual foundation for the ‘rationality of irrationality’—Schelling’s 
idea that it is rational to threaten an act of brute force in order to leverage one’s power to hurt, 
even if it would be irrational to act on that threat in the final instance. 
 
Yet despite—or maybe because of—its centrality, the distinction between brute force and the 
power to hurt remains obscure relative to its significance. Compared to first-strike versus second-
strike capability, or counterforce versus countervalue targeting, the brute force/power to hurt 
distinction remains underdeveloped. The argument in this paper, therefore, makes a unique 
contribution to deterrence theory, one that improves the ability of deterrence theorists to ‘make 
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sense’ of the strategies of non-nuclear weapon states by connecting deterrence theory to the 
transformation of nuclear weapons from an instrument of violence to a currency of power. 
Whereas deterrence theory concentrates attention on the physical characteristics that make 
nuclear weapons an effective instrument of violence, a theory of nuclear weapons as a currency 
of power reveals the importance of scarcity, durability, and divisibility in making nuclear 
weapons—and increasingly, the fissile materials that are necessary to sustain a nuclear chain 
reaction—essential to understanding the practice of ‘trading’ on access to nuclear materials 
within this diplomatic realm. 
 
By grounding a theory of nuclear weapons as a currency of power in the foundational categories 
of deterrence theory this paper brings a new perspective to contemporary debates about nuclear 
deterrence and nonproliferation. For instance, it brings an added level of theoretical depth to 
Vipin Narang’s arguments about “catalytic deterrence,” a nuclear deterrence strategy designed to 
draw the attention of a third party.44 It also interacts with the contemporary debates about 
disarmament, including Nick Ritchie’s development of the idea of ‘devaluing’ nuclear weapons 
as a key element of moving toward a nuclear weapon free world.45 Finally, it provides new 
insights into the nuclear strategy of non-nuclear weapon states, like Iran, who have already 
begun leveraging the production of nuclear materials by engaging in a strategy of ‘weaponless 
nuclear deterrence-by-denial’—simultaneously flirting with the possibility of crossing the 
nuclear threshold to garner international attention and maintaining a credible commitment to 
their ‘peaceful’ nuclear program by making it difficult to destroy. That attention became a key 
component of a high-stakes foreign policy and military strategy to change Iran’s standing vis-à-
vis the established nuclear weapon states and become a recognized regional power. 
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